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INTRODUCTION
This case is about an insurer’s denial of benefits in a professional liability policy
issued to a non-profit corporation.  Plaintiff/Appellant, Equine Assisted Growth and
Learning Association (“EAGALA”), purchased a non-profit organization liability
insurance policy (“policy”) from Carolina Casualty Insurance Company (“Carolina
Casualty”).  A former employee, Greg Kersten, sued EAGALA’s Board of Trustees, in
the name of EAGALA, without any authority to act on EAGALA’s behalf.  EAGALA
sought coverage under the policy in defending against the action.  A copy of the policy is
attached hereto as Exhibit “B”.  Carolina Casualty refused to provide a defense asserting
that the claim was brought on behalf of the “insured entity” against the defendants in the
2underlying case.  Carolina Casualty applied an “insured versus insured” exclusion found
in the policy to deny it had any duty to defend against the claims.  Carolina Casualty
refused to take into account that less than a week after the complaint (hereinafter
“Kersten’s Complaint”) was filed, the court determined that the lawsuit was not properly
brought in the name of EAGALA and therefore no valid factual basis existed on which to
invoke the “insured versus insured” exclusion.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 78A-4-103, the matter having been referred to it by the Supreme Court of Utah
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-3-102(4) (1953 as amended), and Rule 42 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1) Whether an insurer has a duty to defend is generally found by comparing the
allegations of the complaint to the terms of the policy.  Kersten’s Complaint, ostensibly
brought in EAGALA’s name, asserts claims of wrongdoing done both to EAGALA and
Kersten individually.  Given Kersten’s individual claims, did Carolina Casualty properly
deny a defense to the Complaint?  
2) When insurance coverage disputes arise and the insurance policy requires the
insurer to investigate whether a claim is valid, Utah case law requires a court to review
extrinsic evidence to decide if a duty to defend exists.  EAGALA’s insurance policy
3requires Carolina Casualty to cover expenses associated with investigating claims brought
against EAGALA’s trustees and directors.  Was the trial court’s refusal to consider
extrinsic evidence proper in this case?     
ISSUES RAISED AND CONSIDERED
The foregoing issues were raised in the Complaint, R. 1-7, Carolina Casualty’s
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (R. 113), the supporting memorandum (R. 73, 78-
79), in EAGALA’s Memorandum in Opposition (R. 172-181), and finally, in Carolina
Casualty’s Reply in Further Support (R. 235-239).  The issues were considered and ruled
upon in the Memorandum Decision dated February 27, 2008 (R. 250-253).  A copy of the
lower court’s Memorandum Decision in this case is attached hereto as Exhibit “A”. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The lower court made no findings of fact.  For purpose of a motion for judgement
on the pleadings, Carolina Casualty admitted the facts as presented in EAGALA’s
complaint.  See, Defendants’ Memorandum in Support of Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings (“Defendants’ Memo”), p. 2 (R. 74).  As a result, EAGALA’s appeal is only as
to the lower court’s conclusions of law, i.e. whether a duty to defend existed under the
terms of EAGALA’s insurance contract with Carolina Casualty.  
A court’s conclusions of law are reviewed for correctness.  State v. Pena, 869 P.2d
932, 935 (Utah 1994); Drake v. Industrial Comm’n, 939 P.2d 177, 181 (Utah 1997). 
“‘[C]orrectness’ means the appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer
4in any degree to the trial judge’s determination of law.”  Id. at 935; Orton v. Carter, 970
P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).  Finally, the “‘[i]nterpretation of the terms of a
contract is a question of law.  [An appellate court] accord[s] the trial court’s legal
conclusions regarding the contract no deference and review[s] them for correctness.’” 
Covey v. Covey, 2003 UT App 380, ¶16, 80 P.3d 553, cert. denied, 90 P.3d 1041 (Utah
2004) (quoting Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Constr., Inc., 1999 UT 69, ¶6, 983 P.2d 575).       
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1)  EAGALA brought a complaint against Carolina Casualty for the insurer’s
failure to provide a defense against a lawsuit filed by a former employee.  R. 1-7.  
2) Carolina Casualty moved the court for judgment on the pleadings.  R. 113. 
Carolina Casualty argued that an exclusion in the policy applied that “specifically
excludes coverage on any claims brought on behalf of, or in the right of EAGALA against
the insured.”  R. 75.  
3) EAGALA opposed the motion.  R. 167.  EAGALA argued that Kersten’s
Complaint was actually a list of grievances brought by Greg Kersten, a former officer and
employee of EAGALA, an individual who had no authority to sue in the name of
EAGALA.  R. 3 (Complaint, ¶¶ 10-12).  EAGALA also asserted that Kersten’s
Complaint was improperly brought in the name of EAGALA, and as a result the
exclusion did not apply.  R. 176-177.  EAGALA argued that the lower court should not
focus solely on the underlying complaint, but should take into account extrinsic evidence
5that the underlying complaint was really a complaint for wrongful termination and other
claims covered by the policy.  Id.  
4) The matter came for hearing on February 5, 2007.  R 249    
5) The lower court issued a Memorandum Decision granting Carolina Casualty’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings.  R. 250-253.   The court found that “a plain
reading of the Original Complaint in light of the specific policy exclusion at issue, leaves
no doubt that the underlying lawsuit fall within the ambit of the exclusion.”  R. 252.  As a
result, the court neither examined the allegations of the underlying complaint, nor
examined extrinsic evidence regarding the propriety of the underlying complaint.  R. 250-
253.      
11) This timely appeal followed.  R. 254-255.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.  UNDERLYING LAWSUIT
1.  Greg Kersten resigned as CEO of EAGALA and as an EAGALA trustee on
March 23, 2005.  R. 123 (Thomas Aff., ¶ 5).  He remained a paid employee of EAGALA.
R. 123 (Thomas Aff., ¶ 6).
  References to “Complaint” are to the complaint filed below in this action. 1
References to “Kersten’s Complaint” are to the underlying action that formed the basis of
this enforcement action.  
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2.  After discovering some questionable business practices, the Board of Trustees
for EAGALA terminated Greg Kersten’s employment on November 16, 2005.  R. 2
(Complaint , ¶ 8); R. 123 (Thomas Aff., ¶ 7).  1
3.  Greg Kersten initiated a legal action on November 17, 2005, captioned Equine
Assisted Growth and Learning Association, Inc. v. Lynn Thomas, David Currie, Mickey
DiGiacomo, Lisa Roskens, Barbara Scott, Tim Jobe, Amy Blossom, David Tidmarsh, and
Rhonda Smith, Case No. 050403512, assigned to Judge Steven L. Hansen in the Fourth
Judicial District Court for Utah County, State of Utah (“Kersten’s Complaint”).  R. 2
(Complaint, ¶ 9); R. 123 (Thomas Aff., ¶ 8).  
4.  A copy of Kersten’s Complaint is attached hereto as Exhibit “C” (R. 128-140).   
5.  Although it was styled as an action on behalf of EAGALA, Kersten’s
Complaint was, in fact, a complaint of wrongful termination and the airing of other claims
against EAGALA.  R. 3 (Complaint, ¶ 10); R. 123 (Thomas Aff., ¶ 10).  
6.  Kersten filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) on the same
day he filed his complaint.  R. 3 (Complaint, ¶ 11); R. 123 (Thomas Aff., ¶ 11).  
77.  Kersten had no authority to bring an action in the name of EAGALA on
November 17, 2005.  R. 3 (Complaint, ¶ 12).  The action was improperly brought in the
name of EAGALA.  R. 123 to 124 (Thomas Aff., ¶ 12, ¶ 13, and ¶ 19).
8.  When he filed the complaint, Kersten was no longer an EAGALA trustee.  R.
123-4 (Thomas Aff., ¶ 5 & ¶ 12).  Furthermore, Kersten was no longer an employee of
EAGALA.  R. 123-4 (Thomas Aff, ¶ 7 & ¶ 12).  Kersten’s association with EAGALA
had been terminated on the preceding day, November 16, 2005.  R. 3 (Complaint, ¶ 12);
R. 123-4 (Thomas Aff., ¶ 12).  
9.  The individuals named as Defendants in Kersten’s Complaint were the
members of the EAGALA Board of Trustees.  R. 3 (Complaint, ¶ 13); R. 124 (Thomas
Aff., ¶ 14). 
10.  The individuals named as Defendants in Kersten’s Complaint were individual
insureds under EAGALA’s insurance policy with Carolina Casualty.  R. 161 (Policy at p.
2).    
11.  Kersten was granted a TRO allowing him to obtain temporary control over
EAGALA property and assets.  R. 3 (Complaint, ¶ 14); R. 124 (Thomas Aff., ¶ 15).
12.  Within a week, EAGALA presented the court with facts showing that Kersten
was no longer affiliated with EAGALA.  The TRO was dissolved on November 23, 2005. 
The court ordered, among other things, that  “ . . . Kersten shall cease and desist from
8communicating or representing to anyone that he is entitled to act on behalf of EAGALA
and/or that he represents EAGALA’s interests.”  R. 3 (Complaint, ¶ 15); R. 124 (Thomas
Aff., ¶ 16 & ¶ 17).  A copy of the court’s order is attached hereto as Exhibit “D”.   
13.  In a Memorandum Decision dated November 16, 2006, the court found that
Kersten’s Complaint was improperly brought in the name of EAGALA.  R. 124 (Thomas
Aff., ¶ 18); see also, R 148 (“this action was improperly brought in EAGALA’s name.”) 
14.  A copy of that decision is attached hereto as Exhibit “E” (R. 146-150). 
15.  After his first legal action was dismissed, Greg Kersten brought a second
lawsuit against EAGALA properly styled as a wrongful termination.  Carolina Casualty is
providing a defense to EAGALA at the insurer’s expense under the policy.  R. 124
(Thomas Aff., ¶ 20). 
II.  TERMS OF THE POLICY
16.  EAGALA purchased non-profit organization liability insurance from Carolina
Casualty Insurance Company.  R. 124 (Thomas Aff., ¶ 19).
17.  A copy of the policy is attached hereto as Exhibit “B” (R. 153-166).  
18.  The Policy provides coverage for “Costs of Defense” defined as:
[R]easonable and necessary fees, costs and expenses ... resulting solely from
the investigation, adjustment, defense and appeal of any Claim against the
Insureds ... .
R. 160 (emphasis in original).  
919.  A “claim” is defined in the policy as:
Claim(s) means a written demand for monetary or non-monetary relief
including, but not limited to, a civil, criminal, administrative or arbitration
proceeding; provided, however, that the term Claim shall not include labor or
grievance arbitration subject to a collective barganing agreement.  A Claim
shall be deemed to have been first made at the time notice of the Claim is
first received by any Insured.
R. 160 (emphasis in original).
20.  The policy covers a “Loss” arising from a Claim made against the
individual insureds.  R. 161.  A “Loss” includes Costs of Defense.  Id.  “Loss” also
includes coverage for “Wrongful Acts” and “Wrongful Employment Acts” as
defined under the policy.  R. 161-162.  The allegations in Kersten’s Complaint fall
under the definition of “Wrongful Employment Acts” as defined in the policy.  R. 
131-135 (Kersten’s Complaint, ¶¶ 23-25, 28-29, 32-33, 37-38, & 40).
   21.  The policy also states:
THIS POLICY PROVIDES COVERAGE ON A CLAIMS MADE AND
REPORTED BASIS SUBJECT TO ITS TERMS.  THIS POLICY APPLIES
ON TO ANY “CLAIM” FIRST MADE AGAINST THE INSUREDS AND
REPORTED TO THE INSURER DURING THE POLICY PERIOD, THE
AUTOMATIC EXTENDED REPORTING PERIOD, OR THE
PURCHASED EXTENDED REPORTING PERIOD.  
 
R. 153 (“all caps” in original).  
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22.  The policy contains the following exclusion:
The Insurer shall not be liable to make any payment for Loss in connection
with any Claim made against an Insured:
[]  by, on behalf of, or in the right of the Insured Entity; provided,
however, this exclusion does not apply to any Claim that is a
derivative action brought or maintained on behalf of the Insured
Entity, but only if such Claim is instigated and continued totally
independent of, and totally without the solicitation of, or assistance
of, or active participation of, or intervention of any Individual
Insured or the Insured Entity.
R. 163.    
23.  On March 2, 2006, Carolina Casualty’s claims administrator denied coverage
claiming that the complaint was brought “by, on behalf of, or in the right of” EAGALA
and applied the exclusion to deny coverage.  R. 43.    
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A comparison of allegations in the underlying complaint, to the coverage terms of
the policy, show that the lower court committed plain error in finding that there was no
duty to defend.  In the alternative, EAGALA’s policy required the lower court to examine
extrinsic evidence in determining Carolina Casualty’s duty to defend.  That evidence
would have shown that the Kersten’s Complaint was not properly brought in EAGALA’s
name, but asserted claims by Kersten as an employee or former employee of EAGALA
for wrongful termination.
11
ARGUMENT
I.  THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN FAILING TO
COMPARE THE TERMS OF THE POLICY TO THE CLAIMS SET
FORTH IN KERSTEN’S COMPLAINT.
  In general, the duty to defend is a contractual construction, arising out of the
insurance policy.  The Utah Supreme Court has instructed, “‘As a general rule, an
insurer’s duty to defend is determined by comparing the language of the insurance policy,
with the allegations in the complaint.’”  Fire Insurance Exchange v. Estate of Therkelsen,
2001 UT 48, ¶ 21, 27 P.3d 555 (quoting 14 Lee R. Russ & Thomas F. Segalla, Couch on
Insurance § 200:18 (3  ed. 1999)).  However, that is not the end of the inquiry.  The “dutyrd
to defend exists ‘when those allegations, if proved, could result in liability.’”  Nova Cas.
Co. v. Able Constr., Inc., 1999 UT 69, ¶ 6, 983 P.2d 575; Green v. State Fire & Casualty
Company, 2005 UT App 564, ¶ 19, 127 P.3d 1279.  The “duty to defend is measured by
the nature and kinds of risks covered by the policy and arises whenever the insurer
ascertains facts which give rise to the potential of liability under the policy.”  Deseret Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 714 P.2d 1143, 1146 (Utah 1986). 
The lower court acknowledged that a court must examine the allegations in the
underlying complaint in comparison to the coverage provided by the policy.  The court
stated:
The core issued presented by the Defendants’ Motion is whether the
allegations, as set forth in the Complaint filed in the underlying lawsuit
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(“Original Complaint”), created a duty for the Plaintiff’s insurer (Carolina
Casualty) to defend.
  
R. 250.    
Despite this statement, the lower court failed to examine the coverage provisions
of the policy, and failed to compare that language with the allegations in the underlying
complaint.  Rather, the court appears to have looked at the parties in the underlying
complaint, and found that the exclusion asserted by Carolina Casualty applied.
The Court agrees with the Defendants that a plain reading of the Original
Complaint in light of the specific policy exclusion at issue, leaves no doubt
that the underlying lawsuit fall within the ambit of the exclusion.
R. 252.  
There is no doubt that, for the purposes of this appeal, EAGALA’s claims against
Carolina Casualty fall within the coverage terms of this policy.  Rather, Carolina Casualty
attempts to avoid liability by invoking an exclusion that it has no obligation to provide
coverage where an insured under the policy sues another insured.  The exclusion raised by
Carolina Casualty was that Kersten’s Complaint was brought “by, on behalf of, or in the
right of” EAGALA. 
Utah law clearly establishes that insurance contracts are interpreted in favor of the
insured.
Although we construe insurance contracts using the same interpretive tools
we use to review contracts generally, we have frequently declared that
because insurance contracts are adhesion contracts, they are to be
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“construed liberally in favor of the insured and their beneficiaries so as to
promote and not defeat the purposes of insurance.”
Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Versaw, 2004 UT 73, ¶ 24, 99 P.3d 796 (citing United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 521 (Utah 1993)).  Coverage
provisions are to be read broadly, and exclusionary provisions are to be read narrowly
against the insurer.  Sandt, 854 P.2d at 524 (“an insurer must use explicit language if it
intends to limit coverage by an exclusion”); see also Wolf v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
America, 50 F.3d 793, 799-800 (10  Cir. 1995)(words of inclusion are liberally construedth
in favor of the insured whereas words of exclusion strictly construed against the insurer);
Hoffman v. Life Ins. Co. of N. America, 669 P.2d 410, 417 (Utah 1983) (applying rule
that ambiguities be resolved against drafter in construing insurance contract); Phillips v.
Utah Local Gov’ts Trust, 660 P.2d 249, 250 (Utah 1983) (same).  Because Carolina
Casualty relies upon an exclusion to deny coverage, the provision should be construed
narrowly, and the burden is upon Carolina Casualty to prove that the exclusion applies.    
The policy indicates that Carolina Casualty will provide a defense against claims
made against the insureds.  Part of that obligation is to provide “Costs of Defense”
associated with Kersten’s claims.  The policy language makes clear that those costs will
include “investigation” of the claims asserted by Kersten in the original Complaint.   R.
160; see also Statement Facts, supra at ¶ 18.  A review of Kersten’s Complaint  reveals,
  Kersten refers to himself throughout his complaint as “EAGALA’s Director,2
President and CEO.”  He also references himself as a board member, and indeed
chairman of the board of trustees.  However, the undisputed facts establish that at the time
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inter alia, the following allegations against the defendants in that case (the insured Board
of Trustees): 
•Providing “false and/or misleading information regarding” Kersten.  R. 131
(Kersten’s Compliant, ¶ 23). 
•Trying to undermine Kersten.  R. 131 (Kersten’s Compliant, ¶ 24).
•Interfering with Kersten’s duties.  R. 131 (Kersten’s Compliant, ¶ 25). 
•Removal of Kersten as President and CEO.  R. 132 (Kersten’s Compliant, ¶ 28). 
•Interference with Kersten’s access to EAGALA’s money and equipment.  R. 132
(Kersten’s Compliant, ¶ 29). 
•Providing false and misleading information regarding Kersten.  R. 133 (Kersten’s
Compliant, ¶ 32). 
•Depriving Kersten of control of business assets and resources.  R. 133 (Kersten’s
Compliant, ¶ 33). 
•Damage to Kersten’s reputation and business relations.  R. 134 (Kersten’s
Compliant, ¶¶ 37 & 38). 
•Wrongful interference with Kersten’s employment.  R. 135 (Kersten’s Compliant,
¶ 40).   2
Kersten filed his complaint, he had resigned as a trustee and had been terminated as an
employee.  R. 2, 3 & 5 (Complaint, ¶¶ 8, 12, 15, & 21).  
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These claims are all clearly covered by the policy.  R. 156 & 161.  
In addition, the Kersten Complaint specifically refers to the “alleged resignation”
of Kersten as Chairman of the Board of Trustees.  R. 132-133 (Kersten’s Complaint, ¶
31).  Importantly, this allegation in Kersten’s Complaint, on its face, gives reason to
question whether Kersten had authority to act in the name of EAGALA.  This allegation
alone required Carolina Casualty to look further into whether the “insured versus insured”
exclusion applied.   
Carolina Casualty owed a duty to defend the insureds against these allegations. 
The lower court could not ignore the allegations of Kersten’s Complaint and solely focus
on the purported parties to the lawsuit.   Had the lower court carefully examined the terms
of Kersten’s Complaint, it would have seen a number of allegations that triggered
Carolina Casualty’s duty to, at the very least, investigate whether the allegations made by
Kersten allowed the “insured versus insured” exclusion to apply.  
Finally, the “insured versus insured” exclusion itself contemplates the need to look
beyond the terms of Kersten’s Complaint to determine whether the exclusion applies. 
The exclusion states it does not apply to a derivative action “... but only if such claim is
instigated and continued totally independent of, and totally without the solicitation of, or
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assistance of, or active participation of, of intervention of any Individually Insured or the
Insured Entity.”    R. 163.  This case does not involve a derivative action.  However, the
quoted language makes clear that before Carolina Casualty will apply the exclusion, it
will be required to take action to evaluate the facts surrounding the underlying claim and
whether a good faith factual basis exists for the “insured versus insured” exclusion to
apply.  This duty to look into the underlying claim dovetails closely with the duty the
policy terms impose on Carolina Casualty to carry out an “investigation” of all claims
made against the insureds.  R. 160.  In this case, the falsity of Kersten’s claimed authority
to act on behalf of EAGALA was quickly revealed.  In less than a week after he filed his
complaint, the court ruled that Kersten had no authority to act in the name of EAGALA. 
The trial court determined that Kersten’s Complaint did not involve claims by an insured
against an insured.  All this information was established and known to Carolina Casualty
before EAGALA asked it to provide a defense to Kersten’s Complaint.  But, Carolina
Casualty ignored these facts and clung to the “insured versus insured” exclusion as a way
to get out of providing a defense for EAGALA and its board of trustees and directors.   
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II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO EXAMINE EXTRINSIC
EVIDENCE THAT KERSTEN HAD NO AUTHORITY TO BRING A
LAWSUIT IN EAGALA’S NAME.  
As argued above, the terms of the policy and the allegations set forth in Kersten’s
Complaint, without more, demonstrate that the lower court erred in dismissing
EAGALA’s compliant.  In the alternative, the lower court should have analyzed extrinsic
evidence in its determination that coverage should have been provided.  As noted,
Carolina Casualty asserted that the lower court must only look at two documents: 1)
Kersten’s Complaint, and 2) the policy.  R. 78.  To support that proposition, Carolina
Casualty relied on Allstate Indemnity Company v. Thatcher, 2007 UT App 183, 164 P.3d
445, Therkelsen, supra, and, Green, supra.  Thatcher and Green are distinguishable. 
Therkelsen, on the other hand, reveals that the court should have examined extrinsic
evidence to see if coverage must have been provided by Carolina Casualty.  
A.  PURSUANT TO THE TERMS OF A PARTICULAR POLICY, EXTRINSIC
EVIDENCE IS ALLOWED IN DETERMINING THE DUTY TO DEFEND.
The Utah Supreme Court, in Therkelsen, makes clear that extrinsic evidence is
allowed to show a duty to defend in certain situations.  Therkelsen involved a domestic
dispute where a husband shot his wife, her paramour and then himself.  2001 UT 48 at ¶¶
6-7.  The paramour survived and sued the husband’s estate for damages.  Id. at ¶ 9. 
Ironically, in Therkelsen, it was the insurer who sought to introduce extrinsic evidence in
an attempt to terminate its duty to defend.  The insurer initially defended the claim, but
  The language of the policy in Therkelsen stated that the insurer “would pay those3
damages which an insured becomes legally obligated to pay because of bodily injury or
property damages resulting from an occurrence to which this coverage applies.”  Id. at ¶
8. 
18
after obtaining certain evidence, sought summary judgment that it had no duty to
indemnify nor defend.  Id. at ¶ 10.  3
The Therkelsen court stated
whether extrinsic evidence is admissible to determine whether an insurer
has a duty to defend an insured turns on the parties’ contractual terms.  If
the parties make the duty to defend dependent on the allegations against the
insured, extrinsic evidence is irrelevant to a determination of whether a duty
to defend exists.  However, if, for example, the parties make the duty to
defend dependent on whether there is actually a “covered claim or suit,”
extrinsic evidence would be relevant to a determination of whether a duty to
defend exists. 
 
Id. at ¶ 25.    
In analyzing the duty to defend the court instructed as follows:
[H]omeowners policies commonly create “a contractual duty [of an insurer]
to defend its insured against lawsuits by third-parties alleging liability
within the coverage afforded by the policy.  The liability coverage in a
standard homeowners policy provides that the insurer will ‘provide a
defense at [the insurer’s] expense by counsel of [the insurer’s] choice, even
if the suit is groundless, false or fraudulent.’” Douglas R. Richmond, 35
San Diego L Rev. 457, 549 (1998).  In such a case, “The duty to indemnify
[would be] determined by the underlying facts of the case, [while] the duty
to defend [would be] controlled by the allegations in the complaint against
the insured.”  State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. CTC Dev. Corp., 720 So. 2d
1072, 1077 n.3 (Fla 1998).  ...Under such a policy, a determination of the
duty to defend based on the allegations in the complaint, pursuant to the
majority rule, accurately reflects the terms of the parties’ contractual
  Because it did not have the necessary policy provisions, the court remanded the4
case to determine whether the insurer “had a duty to defend the estate based on the actual
contractual terms of [the] policy.”  Therkelsen, 2001 UT 48 at ¶ 26.
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agreement.  Indeed, in such a case it would be error for the trial court to
consider extrinsic evidence, as it is wholly irrelevant to the issue of whether
the insurer has a duty to defend its insured.
 
On the other hand, in Fire Insurance Exchange v. Rosenberg, 930
P.2d 1202 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), the court of appeals had before it an
insurance policy that described the duty to defend as follows: “At our
expense and with attorneys of our choice, we will defend an insured against
any covered claim or suit.”  Id. at 1203.  In such a case, it would be
appropriate for the trial court to consider extrinsic evidence, other wise it
would be unable to determine whether the claim or suit was “covered” by
the policy.    
Id. at ¶¶ 23-24 (emphasis in original; internal footnotes omitted).4
  Therkelsen was subsequently applied by this Court in Rosas v. Eyre, 2003 UT
App 414; 82 P.3d 185.  The first task in deciding whether there is a duty to defend is
determining  “whether [the] policy made the duty to depend on the allegations in the
complaint or on extrinsic evidence.”  Rosas, 2003 UT App 414 at ¶ 21.  The Rosas court
offered the following: 
[A]s an example of a policy where extrinsic evidence could be considered
in determining whether a duty to defend existed, the [Therkelsen] court
cited to “an insurance policy that described the duty to defend as follows:
‘At our expense and with attorneys of our choice, we will defend an insured
against any covered claim or suit.’”
Id., at ¶ 22 (emphasis in original).
20
B.  THE TERMS OF EAGALA’S POLICY REQUIRE EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE TO
BE EXAMINED AS PART OF CAROLINA CASUALTY’S INVESTIGATION
OF CLAIMS BROUGHT AGAINST ITS INSUREDS.    
The language of EAGALA’s policy is not restricted to solely what the complaint
sought to recover and its basis for recovery.  Rather, the policy is drafted in such a
manner that the court must examine extrinsic evidence to “determine whether the claim or
suit was ‘covered’ by the policy.”  Therkelsen, 2001 UT App 48 at ¶ 24.  
EAGALA’s policy is very similar to the example set forth above in Rosa. 
EAGALA’s policy explicitly covers insureds for claims made under the policy.  Indeed,
the Policy places a duty upon Carolina Casualty to provide 
[R]easonable and necessary fees, costs and expenses ... resulting solely from
the investigation, adjustment, defense and appeal of any Claim against the
Insureds ... .
Policy, p. 1 (emphasis in original) (Exhibit “B” attached hereto).  Claims in the policy are
defined as “a written demand for monetary or non-monetary relief, including, but no
limited to, a civil, criminal, administrative or arbitration proceeding ... .”  Exhibit “B”. 
Carolina Casualty has no ability to determine that the “insured versus insured” exclusion
applies until and unless it investigates the underlying claim brought against its insureds. 
Likewise, the court is required look at extrinsic evidence to determine whether the
underlying suit is a claim covered by the policy.  
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C. EXTRINSIC EVIDENCE PROVIDES THE FACTUAL BASIS TO ENFORCE
CAROLINA CASUALTY’S DUTY TO DEFEND EAGALA IN THE
UNDERLYING LAWSUIT.
Had the lower court allowed extrinsic evidence to be introduced, it would have
shown that Kersten had no authority or right to bring a lawsuit in the name of EAGALA. 
R. 2, 3 & 5 (Complaint, ¶¶ 8, 12, 15, & 21); R. 123-124 (Thomas Aff., ¶¶ 12-13, 17 &
19).  Kersten had resigned his position as a board trustee, and had been terminated as an
employee.  R. 123 (Thomas Aff., ¶¶ 5-7).  He was merely a former employee with an axe
to grind.  Thus, the lawsuit was brought by a terminated employee who had a grievance
against the organization, and who used the litigation to seek redress of those grievances,
including wrongful termination and other personal injury claims.  The court in the
underlying litigation immediately recognized that the legal action was improperly brought
in EAGALA’s name, and ultimately dismissed that action.  R. 3 (Complaint, ¶ 15); R. 124
(Thomas Aff., ¶ 19).
The underlying complaint was in fact, one for wrongful termination and other
assorted grievances held by Kersten.  Furthermore, because there was no dispute of facts,
the lower court should have accepted as fact that Kersten’s complaint was one for
wrongful termination.  R. 3 (Complaint, ¶ 10); R. 124 (Thomas Aff., ¶ 16).  Carolina
Casualty likewise recognizes that Kersten’s complaint, in part, was one for interference
with “EAGALA’s employees’ employment.” R. 77 (citing, Kersten’s Complaint, ¶ 40). 
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Finally, Carolina Casualty is currently providing a defense under the policy for a second
lawsuit brought by Greg Kersten for wrongful termination.  R. 124 (Thomas Aff., ¶ 20). 
As such, the claim is covered under the policy, Carolina Casualty owed a duty to defend,
and the lower court erred in failing to find coverage.  
     Whether the a court should allow extrinsic evidence depends upon the language of
the policy.  Therkelsen, 2001 UT 48 at ¶¶ 23-24; Rosas, 2003 UT App 414 at ¶ 22.  The
lower court was required to examine the policy language, and determine whether extrinsic
evidence is allowed.  The language of EAGALA’s policy allows such evidence.  
D.  THE CASES OF GREEN AND THATCHER ARE DISTINGUISHABLE FROM
THE FACTS AT BAR.
Carolina Casualty seized upon policy language in Green and Thatcher (similar
language is quoted in Therkelsen) to try to evade its duty to defend.  Carolina Casualty
claimed, “even if the allegations of the suit are groundless, false or fraudulent, the court
must examine only what is sought to recover and its bases for recovery.”  R. 78-79 (citing
Green, 2005 UT App 564 at ¶ 17).  That is not entirely accurate.  
In Thatcher, the policy read 
Allstate will pay damages which an insured person become legally
obligated to pay because of bodily injury or property damage” arising from
an occurrence, which the Policy defines as “an accident.”  The Policy
further states that “[i]f an insured person is sued for these damages, we will
provide a defense with counsel of our choice, even if the allegations are
groundless, false or fraudulent.
  This language would presumably prohibit extrinsic evidence.  See, Therkelsen,5
2001 UT 48 at ¶ 23  However, Thatcher does not provide any meaningful analysis
because the case was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.  Thatcher, 2007 UT App 183 at ¶
5.  Indeed, the underlying trespass complaint had been dismissed.  As a result, this Court
stated, “Because there is no complaint to analyze, we cannot determine whether Allstate
has a duty to defend.”  Id.
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Thatcher, 2007 UT App 183 at ¶ 3.   Similarly, the policy in Green reads:5
[State Farm] will have the right and duty to defend any claim on suit
seeking damages payable under this policy even though the allegations of
the suit may be groundless, false or fraudulent.
Green 2005 UT App 564 at ¶ 17.  In Green, this Court had to determine if the underlying
litigation “sought damages payable under [the policy] even though the allegation of the
suit may be groundless, false or fraudulent.”  Id.  Based upon that language, and
presumably pursuant to Therkelsen, this Court refused to examine any extrinsic evidence,
regarding the underlying litigation, and examined “only what [the complaint] sought to
recover and its basis for recovery.”  Id. at ¶ 19.    
In contrast, EAGALA’s policy contains additional, different language that,
according to Therkelsen, requires the examination of extrinsic evidence as part of
Carolina Casualty’s investigation of the claims.  EAGALA’s policy, as set forth above, is
a “claims made” type policy.  Carolina Casualty had the obligation to investigate claims
made against its insureds.  It retains that duty not just when it is trying to avoid a third
party’s claims against its insureds.  As part of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
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dealing inherent in every first party insurance contract, Beck v. Farmers Insurance
Exchange, 701 P.2d 795, 798-802 (Utah 1985), that duty exists in investigating whether
the “insured versus insured” exclusion applies.   
Extrinsic evidence, as set forth above, would have proven that the underlying
lawsuit was improperly brought “by, on behalf of, or in the right of” EAGALA by a
terminated employee, who had no authority to do so.  The exclusion, when read in light of
extrinsic evidence, simply does not apply.  
E.  THE TERMS OF EAGALA’S POLICY PROHIBIT CAROLINA CASUALTY’S
SIMPLISTIC APPROACH TO ANALYZING ITS DUTY TO DEFEND.
As noted above, Carolina Casualty argues that it must simply examine the
underlying complaint (Kersten’s complaint) and compare it to the policy to determine if it
must provide coverage.  EAGALA’s policy, however, provides coverage for “Costs of
Defense” as follows:
[R]easonable and necessary fees, costs and expenses ... resulting solely from
the investigation, adjustment, defense and appeal of any Claim against the
Insureds ... .
R. 160 (emphasis in original).  The word “investigation” implies something more
than simply looking at Kersten’s Complaint and comparing it to the policy.  Rather,
that language imposes a duty on Carolina Casualty to look behind the face of the
allegations in Kersten’s Complaint to see if coverage should be provided.  
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The relationship between Carolina Casualty and EAGALA is not a third-party
insurance claim where the parties are adversarial.  Rather, the relationship is a first-
party insurance arrangement where EAGALA has contracted directly with Carolina
Casualty to provide protection from the cost of claims brought against EAGALA by
third parties.  Beck, 701 P.2d at 799-802; see also Billings v.Union Bankers
Insurance Co., 918 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah 1996).  In failing to do investigate Kersten’s
claims, Carolina Casualty violated the express and implied terms of that first party
insurance contract.  
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
The lower court committed a plain error in failing to find a duty to defend.  A
comparison of the allegations in the underlying complaint, to the terms of the policy,
show that the lower court committed plain error in finding that there was no duty to
defend.  In the alternative, EAGALA’s policy allowed the lower court to examine
extrinsic evidence in determining Carolina Casualty’s duty to defend.  That evidence
would have shown that the underlying complaint was one for wrongful termination,
and thus covered under the policy. 
This Court should reverse the lower court’s dismissal of EAGALA’s claims,
and remand this matter to the lower with a mandate to order that Carolina Casualty
owes EAGALA a duty to defend the action brought by Kersten, and that Carolina
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Casualty must reimburse EAGALA for the expenses incurred in defending the
Kersten Complaint. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 5  day of AUGUST, 2008.th
ATTORNEYS FOR EAGALA
by ___________________________
     BRIAN S. KING
     JAMES L. HARRIS, Jr.
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
These issues implicate important rights of insureds with non-profit first party
liability insurance coverage.  The law is unsettled as to whether coverage lies when
an action is improperly brought in the name of an insured, and coverage excluded as
a result.  EAGALA requests oral arguments to respond to this Court’s questions and
assist the Court in its determination of the issues.
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APPENDIX/ATTACHMENTS
Attachment “A”: MEMORANDUM DECISION from this case.
Attachment “B”: NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION LIABILITY
INSURANCE POLICY.
Attachment “C”:  KERSTEN’S COMPLAINT.
Attachment “D”: ORDER DISSOLVING TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER, in underlying case.
Attachment “E”: MEMORANDUM DECISION in underlying case.
ATTACHMENT A
MEMORANDUM DECISION
from this case (R. 250-253).
ATTACHMENT B
NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION
LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY (R. 153-166).
ATTACHMENT C
KERSTEN’S COMPLAINT (R. 128-140).
ATTACHMENT D
ORDER DISSOLVING TEMPORARY RESTRAINING
ORDER, dated November 23, 2005.  R. 23-25.
ATTACHMENT E
MEMORANDUM DECISION from underlying case, 
dated November 16, 2006 (R. 146-151).






















































